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ABSTRACT
Withdrawal of artiﬁcially delivered nutrition and
hydration (ANH) from patients in a permanent vegetative
state (PVS) requires judicial approval in England and
Wales, even when families and healthcare professionals
agree that withdrawal is in the patient’s best interests.
Part of the rationale underpinning the original
recommendation for such court approval was the
reassurance of patients’ families, but there has been no
research as to whether or not family members are
reassured by the requirement for court proceedings or
how they experience the process. The research reported
here draws on in-depth narrative interviews with 10
family members (from ﬁve different families) of PVS
patients who have been the subject of court proceedings
for ANH-withdrawal. We analyse the empirical evidence
to understand how family members perceive and
experience the process of applying to the courts for
ANH-withdrawal and consider the ethical and practice
implications of our ﬁndings. Our analysis of family
experience supports arguments grounded in economic
and legal analysis that court approval should no longer
be required. We conclude with some suggestions for
how we might develop other more efﬁcient, just and
humane mechanisms for reviewing best interests
decisions about ANH-withdrawal from these patients.
INTRODUCTION
In Airedale NHS Trust v Bland,1 the House of
Lords established a lasting precedent that it is not
in the best interests of a patient in a permanent
vegetative state (PVS) to receive artiﬁcial nutrition
and hydration (ANH) and that it can be lawful to
withdraw it. The case prompted a great deal of sub-
sequent ethical analysis about sanctity of life,
quality of life, whether a permanently unconscious
person has ‘interests’ and if so whether it can ever
be in their best interests to die, the deﬁnition of
acts and omissions, ‘medical treatment’ and ‘basic
care’.2–4 This article addresses one aspect of an
issue that has been much less discussed—family
experiences of the continuing requirement, in
England and Wales, for judicial approval before
ANH can lawfully be withdrawn from PVS
patients.
The vast majority of decisions to withdraw or
withhold life-sustaining medical treatments are
never referred to court but are decided and imple-
mented on the basis of common law and profes-
sional guidelines.5 6 These include stipulations that
doctors should not administer ‘futile’ or
‘burdensome’ treatments, or impose treatments that
are refused by a capacitous patient or are not in the
best interests of an incapacitous patient. Under any
such circumstances, it is in accordance with the law
and with professional ethics to withhold or with-
draw life-sustaining treatments, including ANH,
without legal review. The situation for PVS patients
(in England and Wales) is anomalous in that with-
drawing or withholding ANH from this patient
group requires legal review—even in straightfor-
ward cases when families and healthcare teams
agree that cessation of ANH is in the patient’s best
interests.
The requirement for legal review for withdraw-
ing or withholding ANH from patients in PVS is a
legacy of Bland in which the House of Lords
recommended that a court declaration should be
required in such cases ‘at least for the time being
and until a body of experience and practice has
been built up which might obviate the need for
application in every case’.i Despite the view
expressed by the British Medical Association,7
more than a decade after Bland, that PVS cases
should no longer inevitably require court review, it
is now a legal obligation governed by Practice
Direction 9E issued under the authority of the
Court of Protection Rules 2007 (S.I. 2007/1744).
Continuing judicial involvement in ANH-withdrawal
from PVS patients has been criticised for various
reasons. It is out of kilter with international law8 9
and inconsistent with various aspects of domestic
law.9–11 It is also expensive (about £122 000 per
patient)12 and is implicated in a delay (on average
9 months) between the point at which a best inter-
ests decision is made to withdraw ANH and the
time at which that decision can be lawfully imple-
mented.9 This article adds to this body of concern
by focusing speciﬁcally on the experience of the
families of these patients.
Part of the rationale underpinning the original
House of Lords’ recommendation in 1993 for
court approval in PVS cases was ‘the reassurance of
patients’ families’.ii This is despite the fact that the
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iLord Keith of Kinkell in Bland, n.34.
iiAiredale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, per Lord
Goff at 873. Lord Goff in the House of Lords was
approving a ruling by Sir Thomas Bingham in the Court
of Appeal, who in turn was approving the ruling of Sir
Stephen Brown P at ﬁrst instance. Other components of
the rationale included protecting patients, protecting
doctors and reassuring the public.
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parents in Bland, who supported withdrawal of ANH from their
son, ‘could not understand why the courts should be involved’
and were reluctant to give their approval for a court applica-
tion.13 There was no research at the time (nor has there been
since) on whether or not family members in general are ‘reas-
sured’ by the requirement for court proceedings—or more gen-
erally on how they experience the process. In the research
reported here, we address this gap, analysing empirical evidence
to understand how family members perceive and experience the
process of applying to the courts for ANH-withdrawal and con-
sidering the ethical and practice implications of our ﬁndings.
METHOD
The research reported here arose out of a broader in-depth
interview study of families in the UK with experience of having
a relative in a vegetative or minimally conscious state. More
information about the methodology of the broader study has
already been published14 as have ﬁndings relating to families’
perspectives on a range of different aspects of their experience,
including (eg) medical decision making,15 physiotherapy16 and
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanning.17
In an earlier article in this journal,14 we explored family per-
spectives on withdrawal of ANH. We focused on the powerful
symbolism associated with food and water, and our data showed
that very few families of PVS or minimally conscious state
(MCS) patients—even those who have come to believe that the
patient would rather die than continue in their current state—
considered it acceptable to ‘starve and dehydrate’ a relative to
death. This meant that very few (only two of our initial 51
interviewees) had been involved in an application to the courts
for withdrawal of ANH. Since we have a speciﬁc research inter-
est in (i) how family members experience court cases and (ii)
how family members experience the death of a relative from
ANH-withdrawal, we have subsequently recruited families who
could report on these experiences.
The analysis presented in this article, then, draws on in-depth
narrative interviews (around 25 h of recorded data) with 10
people from ﬁve different families whose relative was the
subject of an application to the court for ANH-withdrawal.
Interviews were recorded (sometimes just audio, sometimes
both audio and video), transcribed orthographically and sub-
jected to thematic analysis.18 Video clips from some of the inter-
views are available online at http://www.healthtalk.org.
Our sample size represents probably around 5% of all families
in England and Wales who have ever been involved in applica-
tions of this type that reach court.iii Two families were involved
in the court process when we ﬁrst interviewed them and
provided us with copies of court bundles and associated corres-
pondence, and invited us to attend court hearings. The other
three families were interviewed some years after their relative
had died. Interviewees included the parents, adult children, sib-
lings and in-laws of the patient and several were interviewed
more than once (eg, before and after their relative’s death). We
avoid giving further details due to issues of conﬁdentiality.
In presenting our ﬁndings, we have taken care to maximise
conﬁdentiality while protecting, as far as possible, the integrity of
our data. Some interviewees wanted to be anonymous, but others
were willing to be identiﬁed publicly, including in ﬁlmed extracts
from their interviews posted online (http://www.healthtalk.org/
peoples-experiences/nerves-brain/family-experiences-vegetative-
and-minimally-conscious-states/topics). However, even these
interviewees sometimes wanted particular parts of their inter-
views to be anonymised. Additionally, although the patients
referred to in these interviews are dead, Court of Protection
reporting restrictions may still apply and we—and our intervie-
wees—were concerned to protect the identities of health care
professionals and care homes involved, as well as other family
members. We have developed a set of strategies for managing
these anonymising challenges, including avoidance of details
duplicating those in court transcripts and omission of pseudo-
nyms in some cases to prevent jigsaw identiﬁcation.19
FINDINGS
Our key ﬁnding is that although families did receive some
reassurance from the procedures involved in judicial approval, it
is an oversimpliﬁcation to point simply to the ‘reassurance’ pro-
vided. The process also had the opposite effect, causing distress
and anxiety. Moreover, families were not simply passive recipi-
ents of reassurance but also active agents in the court applica-
tion process. All ﬁve families had taken the initiative in
launching the application process and challenging delays; they
were involved in the process of preparing for the court hearing
and they saw themselves as behaving courageously on behalf of
their relative in actively supporting the decision to withdraw
ANH.
Reassurance: the court as ‘comfort’ and ‘shield’
Reassurance is a slightly patronising term, perhaps reﬂecting the
medical and legal paternalism of the 1990s, which treats fam-
ilies as the passive beneﬁciaries of the court. Our analysis shows
that it does, however, capture some aspects of family experi-
ence: in particular, the court was a ‘comfort’ and a ‘shield’ for
relatives who felt burdened by the ‘momentous’ life-and-death
decision concerning their relative.
All interviewees recognised the huge signiﬁcance and gravity
of the decision to withdraw ANH. They wanted the decision-
making process to be managed with care, professional oversight
and ‘in a balanced way’ (Harry) with ‘time for reﬂection’ and
‘safeguards’ (Helen). As Tim explained:
These are momentous decisions that need to be done by a disin-
terested, authoritative and experienced party […] it’s only right
that momentous decisions like that are made in a forum which
[…] steps back a bit from the individual hospitals and individual
practitioners—just to make sure that the decisions are taken as
dispassionately as possible.
Interviewees felt they bore a heavy burden of responsibility
for ANH-withdrawal—even when (as for both the speakers
below) it was actually the Trust that brought the application to
court. One very positive effect of the court hearing was to share
that burden:
To know actually that someone else who isn’t emotionally
involved is looking dispassionately at those facts and coming to
the same conclusion on a humanitarian basis is actually very com-
forting. ( Josie)
If the Court of Protection wasn’t there to say “Well we are
making the ultimate decision, […]” I would always feel that it
was me who’d actually chosen to do it. And that would be hard
[…] to live with that—almost feeling that you’d sentenced them
to death, however much they wanted it. So the Court of
iiiThere are just over 50 reported cases but many judgements in the
Court of Protection are never reported and we know that some
decisions about ANH-withdrawal from PVS patients have been
among them, including one in the current sample. Our best estimate is
that 100+ such cases have been heard.
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Protection has shielded me from that experience, which is good.
(Hannah)
These families point to positive aspects of the requirement
for a court application for ANH-withdrawal, which we would
want to retain in any alternative procedure advocated.
Initiating the process and challenging delays
Even while recognising the value of the oversight provided by
the court, families were often frustrated and dismayed by the
experience overall—and the requirement for judicial approval
had not shielded them from responsibility for initiating the
process of ANH-withdrawal (and the responsibility associated
with that). The process by which their relative’s case ﬁnally
reached court was one they experienced as disjointed and inef-
fective: they struggled with unnecessary delays in a procedure
administered by people who often did not seem to understand
the system they were supposed to be operating.
In all ﬁve cases, it was family members (not healthcare teams)
who initiated discussion about withdrawal of ANH. One appli-
cation was made by the family, another had been started by the
family but the Trust subsequently agreed to take it over and
the remainder were launched by the Trusts at the prompting of
the families—who actively pursued the application process
when it seemed to falter or stall. Approval was eventually
granted in connection with four of the ﬁve patients represented
here: in each case, ANH was then withdrawn. In the ﬁfth case,
the patient died from other causes before the process was
complete.
Although all ﬁve families had been involved in best interests
consultations with clinicians concerning ceilings of care for their
relative (eg, no cardiopulmonary resuscitation; no aggressive
treatment of infections), some had been unaware that it might
also be possible to withdraw the feeding tube. One interviewee
learnt about this possibility from a newspaper article. Another
was told about it by her therapist. For both, this came some
years after their relative’s injuries.
I said “You know, there are times, when I just wish he [PVS son]
would go to sleep and never wake up”. And she said “Well if that’s
what you truly, truly want, it can be achieved”. And I sort of
looked at her and said “Oh yes, and how?” And she said
“Seriously, there is a process” and said “what you need to do is
write to your Area Health Authority and ask them if they’re pre-
pared to work with you to put a legal case together.” […]
[Interviewer: And this had never been raised with you by the GP or
the consultant or the nursing home?]No. Absolutely not. No no.
In another family, ‘lack of communication’ both about the
patient’s diagnosis and prognosis and about the option of with-
drawing tube feeding left the family “second guessing at the
future, at the state of Mum, where she was going”. They would
have liked “to know it [withdrawal] was an option […] You
know, we were years down the line, not even knowing.”iv These
families felt very strongly that they should not have been put in
the position of discovering for themselves that ANH-withdrawal
was a lawful possibility and then having to initiate discussions
with clinicians.
I don’t think the onus should be on the families to raise the
matter of whether the person […] would be better off to be
actually dead because that’s really troubling to have to even come
to that conclusion, I think, about someone you love.v
We shouldn’t have had to raise it. The consultant said it was
normal for the family to come to raise it. Dr Smith said “oh the
family need to come round to this way of thinking”. That’s
rubbish. The family need information which is clear if they’re
going to come round to anything.
Although one family felt supported by the healthcare team
from the moment of initiating the discussion about withdrawal
(“I can’t commend them enough… They have really tried to
take everything into consideration and they were very keen to
follow [the patient’s] wishes”), the other four families were dis-
mayed that once they had raised the issue of ANH-withdrawal
there seemed to be no system in place for taking their concerns
forward. Helen said that it took 2 years between notifying the
health authority that she believed ANH was not in her son’s
best interests and the formal application to the courts.
A month later they [the health authority] hadn’t even acknowl-
edged the letter. So I wrote to them again and said, “Look,
I know this is a big ask, but could you tell me how far you’ve
got. […] They sent me a letter to say […] “You realise this is
quite difﬁcult. We’ll pass the matter on to our legal department
and when we get some feedback from them we’ll pass it on to
you.” So nine months later nothing had happened.
Two families believed that religious values of healthcare staff
may have accounted for the problems. Lack of knowledge from
professionals about the process was also commonly cited:
The consultant had never done anything like this before and
neither had the Primary Care Trust. It was a massive learning
curve until we got hold of [the lawyer] and then she drove it. But
the organisations doing the caring didn’t have a clue what to do.
We were the victims of no system. There is no system to deal
with it. People within the profession appear to be ignorant of
what the appropriate pathways can be and therefore are not in a
position to give advice to relatives.vi
Delays were also occasioned by disputes about who should
fund the application:
When my sister was in hospital it was the hospital Trust that were
responsible […]. Then she went into a community care situation
by going into [Care Home] and then the responsibility changed
to the Primary Care Trust. And it took again another six months
for them to argue the toss about who’s responsible. […] The
PCT at one stage said “You’ll have to foot the bill if you want to
take this forward”. […] I was thinking, “How will I do that? I’d
have to remortgage the house”. Then they came back and said,
“No, we’ll do it.” (Harry)
Patients’ medical records were often dispersed across several
different hospitals, rehabilitation centres and care homes and
even getting the paperwork together could take several months.
Expert reports required for the application were also a cause of
delay: “Dr X was very good—he got the report to us so quickly.
But Dr Y we had to wait and wait and wait for the report.”
Interviewees felt as though they had been forced into a situation
ivRead more: http://www.healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-
brain/familyexperiences-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/
family–experiences-decision-making#ixzz3RuNfy9Ds
vRead more and see longer clips of family members describing their
experience at: http://www.healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-
brain/family-experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/family-
experiences-applying-court-treatment-withdrawal#ixzz3RH2WjEF4
vihttp://www.healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-brain/family-
experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/gunars-and-
margaret
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in which they were ‘ﬁghting’ and ‘bullying’ medical profes-
sionals. One described the lengths he felt another family
member had needed to go to in order to ensure progress was
made:
[He] never got off the email to them and just badgered, bad-
gered, badgered them. But had he not done that—the poor
people at the PCT!—had he not done that, badgered and
emailed and chased this up, I think it would have been a lot
longer. Whether we would be there now I don’t know.
There was also a signiﬁcant delay between submitting the
application to the court and the judicial decision—ranging, for
these ﬁve families, between 4 and 14 months.
The cumulative effect of these different sources of delay
(delay before families realised that ANH-withdrawal was pos-
sible; delay from that point to making the application; delay
from the application to the court hearing) could be quite sub-
stantial. For example, one family began to believe that it might
be in the best interests of their relative to be allowed to die
about 6 months after the precipitating incident (a stroke) and
the family only came to understand that withdrawing ANH was
a possibility two and a half years later. They raised it with the
Trust at a ﬁrst best interests meeting convened for this purpose
—at which it was agreed that ANH-withdrawal was indeed in
the patient’s best interests. It took more than another year to
prepare the legal case and submit the application—which was
followed by a further 5-month delay before the court hearing.
The patient’s brother commented: “my sister would have been
horriﬁed that it took four and a half years to attain a compas-
sionate and digniﬁed end to her life”. Another family who
describe the process as ‘hideously slow’ formally requested
ANH-withdrawal in letters prepared for a best interests meeting
held 14 months after the precipitating event (a car accident).
It took a further 7 months before the Trust submitted an appli-
cation to the court and another 4 months before the case was
heard (and further medical tests requested). Nearly 4 years after
the precipitating event, the patient’s son found these further
delays ‘unforgivable’.
Overall, family members experienced the process of pursuing
ANH-withdrawal ‘traumatic’, ‘emotionally and mentally drain-
ing’ and ‘like banging our heads against a brick wall’. They felt
angry and distressed at the amount of time and effort they had
to put into this (“especially after you’ve been through so
much”). One interviewee said: “It’s just been months and
months of agony and frustration and the hurt goes on and on.”
Active involvement in the court process
Far from simply being the passive recipients of reassurance,
interviewees were fully involved in preparing for the court
hearing (eg, all families wrote statements supporting withdrawal
to be presented to the courts). The court hearing itself (which
families may—but are not required to—attend) marks the cul-
mination of months or even years of work by families to get to
this point. Four of the ﬁve families believed that without their
active initiation and involvement the court case for
ANH-withdrawal would never have happened. Interviewees
commented that it would have been far easier to cede responsi-
bility to the care homes, Trusts and medical professionals and
just let ANH continue rather than to disturb the status quo by
insisting on (and actively pursuing) an application to the courts.
A member of one family commented:
We were proud of us, in a way, that we had the guts to get up
and speak for her. […] But we did it because we care and we
thought it was a braver thing to do, to go through the court
process. (Olivia)
A member of another family expressed a very similar point of
view:
I think it’s quite brave to say, “Well actually, let’s be responsible
about this and withdraw nutrition and hydration,” and take the
responsibility. […] We […] didn’t just let things carry on […] we
had the courage to actually make a decision, with the court’s
approval, that we should withdraw. (Miggy)
Every one of these interviewees believed that ANH had been
delivered for too long, and that their relative should have been
allowed to be ‘at peace’ much sooner and they were proud of
their role as a family in creating the conditions under which
that could (ﬁnally) happen.
Families were generally positive about the way the case was
handled in court, in particular they appreciated the comments
of judges—clearly designed with the feelings of family members
in mind—about the care and courage shown by the family and
the appropriateness of allowing death. Seven members of one
family attended court (accompanied by one of the researchers)
and were impressed and moved by the gravity of the occasion,
the seriousness with which the best interests of their relative
were discussed and the sensitivity of the judge. At a family meal
afterwards in a pavement café, they toasted their relative and
celebrated the fact that he would soon be at peace (“it was a
lovely day!”). Members of another family attended court via a
video-link in a solicitor’s conference room in another city—
with “tea and biscuits … the loos were on hand… there were
boxes of tissues… and the judge and the QC (Queen’s Council)
handled it beautifully”. An interviewee from a different family
read the judgement for the ﬁrst time and recalled “how kind
everybody was at the court” and found the judgement “rather
beautifully expressed”.vii
Despite these favourable comments about the court hearing
itself, the many months of preparation in the run-up to the
hearing caused a great deal of anxiety. In one family, two close
relatives who wanted to attend the directions hearing were
unable to do so because, after months of delay, it was
announced at 3 days notice while they were abroad. Some
expressed concerns about what they experienced as the ‘adver-
sarial’ nature of the process. The widely publicised case of W v
M20 in which the court refused a family’s application for
ANH-withdrawal from a minimally conscious patient on the
basis of a ‘sanctity of life’ argument added to these concerns.
Several interviewees assumed that the expert clinician appointed
by the Ofﬁcial Solicitor was likely to argue against
ANH-withdrawal: “specialists came down [to examine the
patient]—obviously one ‘For’, one to be ‘Against’” (David). In
recent cases, as some families were aware, a great deal of
emphasis has been placed on accurate diagnosis as a prerequisite
to making a decision about withdrawal. Anxiety about the pos-
sible consequences if their apparently ‘vegetative’ relative were
to be re-diagnosed as ‘minimally conscious’ (as happened in W v
M20) led to additional stress for families who were committed
to ensuring a ‘digniﬁed end’, and were not interested in the
niceties of diagnostic categories because this did not change
their view of what their relative would have wanted.
Confronted with the suggestion that his mother might be MCS
viihttp://www.healthtalk.org/peoples-experiences/nerves-brain/family-
experiences-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/family-
experiences-applying-court-treatment-withdrawal
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rather than PVS, her son responded: “it didn’t make any differ-
ence to me; to me it was academics splitting hairs. And missing
the point.” From this perspective, improvements in diagnostic
technologies (eg, fMRI scanning18) that might result in patients
who were previously labelled ‘vegetative’ now being labelled
‘MCS’, and denied ANH-withdrawal as a consequence, are ser-
iously problematic: far from safeguarding their relative, these
revised diagnoses can lead to continued administration of treat-
ment which (in the view of family members) is not in the
patient’s best interests. The key issue, for these families, was that
their relative would not want to be alive in their current condition
—however, that condition is formally labelled and categorised.
Families who wanted to attend court were anxious about
what it would be like—most had no previous experience of
being in a courtroom. One interviewee who “really didn’t know
what to expect” asked the senior clinician who had assessed her
relative:
At ﬁrst I was thinking, “Oh my God, are they going to be interro-
gating me?”…Professor Z said, “No … it’d be highly unlikely
they’d ask a member of the family to stand up and answer ques-
tions…” […] He said, “you know, you don’t have to be there”.
She was also concerned that “all the [news]papers would go
to town on this case […] and you might get […] people who
were very much against it and would call you a murderer for
agreeing to it”. Despite their largely favourable experiences of
the court hearing itself, several interviewees agreed that ‘people
in authority’ (such as clinicians and ethics committees) could
serve the same function as the court and some remained
dubious about the requirement for court approval. Members of
one family (both parents and the sister of the patient) were
unanimous on this, believing that “the court is the wrong place
for this sort of thing”.
I think it would be much better if you could just decide it with
the clinicians and do without the court case. […] I didn’t actually
mind attending court. It was just such an incredibly long process
[…] It seems more sensible that it could just be decided around a
table […] I mean presumably you don’t involve a court in ‘do not
resuscitate’. (Miggy)
CONCLUSION
Only a tiny minority of families with PVS relatives are involved
in court applications for ANH-withdrawal. These interviewees
are exceptional people. They have overcome enormous barriers
to ANH-withdrawal, including the complexities of navigating
the healthcare and legal systems, and lack of knowledge, inertia
or opposition from heathcare professionals.
In our broader sample, some interviewees (especially those
within a couple of years of the precipitating incident) believed
that ongoing ANH was appropriate for their relative. These
families sometimes reported being reassured by the legal barriers
placed in the way of ANH-removal from PVS patients. One
interviewee, for example, consulted a lawyer about her concern
that the hospital would withdraw her husband’s treatment and
was comforted when informed about “how hard it is to turn off
someone’s feed. […] you have to go to the High Court and it’s
a very big thing to have done” (Felicity). Other interviewees had
come to believe that their PVS relative would rather not be kept
alive but could not accept ANH-withdrawal as an ethical
option, believing it to be ‘cruel’ or ‘barbaric’.14 The special
concern that these families feel about ANH-withdrawal is rein-
forced by the legal treatment of ANH-withdrawal as qualita-
tively different from other treatment withdrawals, such that it
alone among treatment withdrawals requires judicial approval.
Additionally, some were intimidated at the idea of pursuing a
court case and said that they would feel judged or ‘on trial’
themselves. For our broader sample, then, the effect of Practice
Direction 9E is to act as a deterrent to ANH-withdrawal from
PVS patients. This is clearly reassuring for those who do not
want ANH withdrawn, but imposes an additional barrier for
those who believe that ANH-withdrawal might be in their rela-
tive’s best interests. It tilts the balance in favour of continuing
treatment, irrespective of the best interests of the patient.
So where does these empirical data leave us in relation to the
claim that court approval for withdrawing ANH in PVS cases is
necessary in part for the reassurance of patients’ families? Our
analysis shows that it does capture some aspects of family
experience (especially in relation to sharing the burden of deci-
sion making) but renders other aspects invisible—particularly
families’ initiation of, and active engagement in, the process.
What these families were struggling for was so much more than
‘reassurance’ for themselves. They were defending values like
‘human dignity’, ‘respect for [the patient’s] wishes, and her as a
person’ and ‘a peaceful death’. They were willing to bear
responsibility for the ethics of their actions—but did feel vindi-
cated and supported by the court’s decision. On the positive
side, then, experience of reassurance was certainly reported; on
the negative side, this came at the cost of a lengthy and frustrat-
ing process. Especially in the context of other criticisms of the
court application procedure (its expense, the delay it imposes
and the legal anomaly it represents9), there is a strong case for
considering whether the beneﬁts if offers families could be pro-
vided through some alternative less expensive and more stream-
lined procedure.
Finally, insofar as the requirement for judicial approval is
based, in part, on a perceived need to provide reassurance for
families, it is somewhat misplaced. It is the patient (and not the
family) that the court is there to protect. We do not believe that
‘reassuring’ patients’ families (and we have shown that the evi-
dence on this is at best mixed) should take priority over acting
in the best interests of the patient. Delivery of futile care is
recognised as a widespread problem in clinical practice, yet in
the ﬁve cases examined here patients were treated with ANH
for many months after it had been (unanimously) determined at
best interests meetings that this treatment was not in the
patients’ best interests. Two recent Court of Protection cases
concerned PVS patients for whom ANH had been provided for
4 yearsviii and 9 years,ix respectively: in both cases, the family,
the Clinical Commissioning Groups and the Ofﬁcial Solicitor
were in agreement that withdrawal was in the patient’s best
interests and in both the judges declared withdrawal to be
lawful: but neither conveyed any concern about the inappropri-
ate medical treatment meted out to these patients over such
long periods of time.
On the basis of the reports from these ﬁve families,
set alongside other criticisms of the current procedure,7–10 we
believe that we urgently need to develop other more efﬁcient,
just and humane mechanisms for reviewing best interests deci-
sions about ANH-withdrawal from these patients.
One possibility would be to treat ANH-withdrawal from PVS
patients just like ANH-withdrawal from all other patients. This
would mean in accordance with common law and professional
guidelines5 6 21 that clinicians would be able lawfully to
viiiNHS Trust v AW [2013] EWHC 78 (COP).
ixGloucestershire Clinical Commissioning Group v AB [2014] EWCOP
49.
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withdraw ANH without recourse to the courts if they deter-
mined that ANH was not in the patient’s best interests (and if
this was not contested). It has already been argued that there is
no legal rationale for treating PVS (and MCS) patients differ-
ently from all others:9–11 equality of treatment under the law
would recognise their right to equal protection from futile, bur-
densome and unwanted treatment that is not in their best inter-
ests. For patients’ families, this would remove one important
source of the delays during which inappropriate treatment con-
tinued to be administered to their relative, and would have
allowed the patient to be ‘at peace’ much sooner. Families
would no longer have to endure (what some experienced as) the
continued medical ‘torture’ of their relative over the course of
additional months or years of waiting for a court hearing, nor
face the steep learning curve, stress and anxiety involved in
engaging with an ‘adversarial’ court process. We also suggest, on
the basis of our broader data set, that more families would be
able to accept ANH-withdrawal if the deterrent effect of a court
application were removed—especially given the special signiﬁ-
cance it adds to the already symbolically powerful meanings of
withdrawing nutrition and hydration.
Set against these beneﬁts would be the loss of ‘therapeutic jur-
isprudence’.9 To preserve these beneﬁts, healthcare teams
making best interests decisions not to continue ANH-treatment
would need to ensure (as they should do currently22) that family
members know that the decision is not theirs to make, that the
burden of responsibility lies with the clinical team and that
everyone involves recognises the immense gravity of the decision
to allow death. Excellent palliative care of the type approved by
the courts would also need to be ensured, as well as considering
how to address what families often experience as major differ-
ences between withdrawal from patients who are clearly dying
irrespective of ANH-withdrawal and those in PVS/MCS who
could be maintained for years or decades. Finally, simply abol-
ishing the requirement for a court hearing will not address the
broader problems faced by these patients and their families,
which relate to the (sometimes total) absence of best interest
consultations, default presumptions of continued treatment and
decision making based on criteria other than the best interests
of the patient.11 14 15
If abolishing the requirement for judicial approval seems a step
too far, there are steps that could be taken to speed up the court
process. These cases are often not seen as ‘urgent’—compared, for
example, with life-threatening situations such as disputes about
emergency surgery which can be heard by the courts within days
or even hours. When a PVS patient’s feeding tube perishes or
becomes dislodged and the need for replacing it is challenged,
cases can reach court very quickly (eg, in Re D (Medical
Treatment) [1998] 1 FLR 411 within 3 days). But so long as ANH
is continuing then, despite the existence of a best interests decision
(by clinicians in consultation with family and carers) that it should
not be, there is no apparent urgency to protect patients against
potential assault (ie, invasive treatment not in their best interests).
Shifting priorities in the judiciary to recognise the importance of
hearing cases where ANH treatment is continuing just as rapidly as
when it is not would beneﬁt patients and their families—and since
there are relatively few such cases this should not impose too
much of a burden on the system.
Other suggestions for speeding up the court process include
permitting consideration of applications concerning PVS
patients by Court of Protection judges at District Judge and
Circuit Judge level (not only by the President of the Court of
Protection or High Court judges nominated by him) and requir-
ing only written (rather than written and oral) evidence.23 The
latter procedure could be modelled on Re X24 which was intro-
duced to streamline Deprivation of Liberty cases and would
involve ﬁling speciﬁed documents (see Annex A of ref. 24),
which would include demonstrated compliance with relevant
guidelines and written evidence from family and carers. The evi-
dence could include an independent second medical opinion
and evidence of the patient’s likely wishes and the steps taken to
identify those wishes. The decision could then be made on the
basis of written evidence unless there was a disagreement con-
cerning diagnosis, in which case an oral hearing would be
required.
In summary, the combined evidence (to which we have con-
tributed here the experience of family members) provides strong
support for the claim that the current requirements and proce-
dures for approving ANH-withdrawal from PVS patients are not
working. They are expensive, cumbersome, protracted and
unclear to people caught up in them. They add to, rather than
relieve, human suffering. They are not serving the best interests
of patients (or their families). As a society, we can and must do
better than this.
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